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Strengthening of the relations between central and local tiers of government and the 
decreasing of the role of the middle tier are decentralisation trends of recent years 
across the world. These processes are accompanied by the devolution of additional 
responsibilities to local governments without sufficient grants from senior governments. 
Thus, following these trends of the last decades requires assigning additional revenues 
to local governments to make them fiscally sustainable. These revenues should be 
reliable and stable, so that local governments are able to provide services and sustain 
living standards on the high level. 
As Steytler argues, financing of local governments reflects the practice of local 
autonomy, ‘determining whether local governments can make and implement policy 
choices in response to their constituencies’ preferences’ (Steytler, 2009: 418-419). As 
he reasons, where local governments raise most of their revenue independently, a high 
level of autonomy follows, and conversely, reliance mainly on transfers from central 
governments, especially conditional grants that are tied to particular outcomes, usually 
results in local governments’ financial dependency and policy subservience to central 
government (Steytler, 2009: 419). Thus, sufficiently high level of financial self-reliance 
in collecting resources is key issue to exercising local autonomy and proximity of local 
government policy to citizens’ needs. 
Local taxes, sharing of national taxes, and grants from other tiers of government are 
the most significant revenue sources of local governments. The trade-off between 
these types of revenues defined in the legal framework depends on the fiscal 
decentralisation policy of a given country, premised by the historical background and 
economic conditions. Within national economic strategy of development, it should be 
decided which locally generated revenues – local taxes or sharing of national tax – are 
more appropriate and efficient for gaining the principal macroeconomic aims of a given 
state. 
A benefits based model is considered to be the most appropriate model for addressing 
local tax issues. Its main principle is formulated as follows: local taxes should fund 
those services from which local residents benefit. In this context, defining all the 
stakeholders becomes an important issue. It is to be decided which tax or mix of taxes 
local citizens and businesses should be taxed with, and which solution is fiscally 
sustainable and most appropriate from economic and administrative point of view 
(Kitchen, 2004). The other model called taxation based on ability to pay criteria, is 
better applied to national taxation rather than to local taxation, since tax instruments 
are more restricted for local governments (Kitchen, 2004: 14). 
From the theoretical point of view, there exist the following criteria for choosing taxes to 
fund local services: immobility of tax base, limited opportunity to export the tax to other 
jurisdictions, lack of latent causes of harmful competition between different tiers of 
government, and ease of administering the tax locally. According to these criteria, 
property tax is soundly considered as the most appropriate local tax. However, in 
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economies in transition property taxation is not a viable solution as a source of 
financing local governments, due to the difficulties in administration of the tax. This is 
an issue when the tax base is property value, and real estate market does not function 
properly, which is common for transition economies (Kitchen, 2004: 12).  
Due to the criteria mentioned above, income tax on individuals is the next tax in the list 
which can be considered as a source of financing local government. Income tax, as 
well as sales tax, is more revenue elastic than property tax; income tax is also easier to 
administer. In addition, there is not much room for exporting criterion within revenue 
sharing of national taxes between different tiers of government. On the other hand, 
both taxes may be exported to other municipalities. This opportunity bears the potential 
risk of reduction of local accountability. In its turn, decrease of accountability may lead 
to inefficiencies in the allocation of local resources (Kitchen, 2004: 17). For companies 
that generate income, cost of doing business is an important factor in inter-municipal or 
inter-regional location decisions. Since capital is highly mobile, corporate income tax is 
under high risk to be exported, thus making it inappropriate for local governments. 
High capital mobility was a reason for decreasing the shares of enterprise profit 
tax (EPT) assigned to local governments in Ukraine where special economic areas 
were introduced. These taxes were created in 1992 with the aim of fostering the 
development of regional economies. Special economic areas proposed exceptional 
taxation regimes that caused inequality of EPT revenues levied in different 
municipalities, and created huge disparities between the regions. Enterprises ‘voted 
with their feet’, making EPT a non-reliable source for local needs. 
Theoretical background suggests that individual income taxes are suitable for use by 
several tiers of government (McLure, 1999). While central government may apply a 
progressive income tax with the aim of stabilisation and redistribution of resources, 
employing of a flat-rate tax might be more appropriate for sub-national governments. 
Thus, individual income taxes align with the fiscal aim of paying for the benefits of local 
public services. 
Due to the reasons mentioned above, sharing of personal income tax (PIT) is one of 
the most appropriate revenue sources for local governments in transition economies. 
This tax is highly important in the decentralisation process since it is one of the main 
sources of revenues of local governments in a number of transition economies. As of 
2009 PIT brings about a half (or more) of tax revenues of local budgets in such 
economies in transition or countries which recently completed transformation process 
as Estonia (91.5%), Croatia (90.6%), Latvia (88.2%), Lithuania (85.8%), 
Slovenia (78.9%), Ukraine (75.2%), Slovak Republic (75.1%), Russian 
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Federation (69.8%), Moldova (68.9%), Serbia (67.6%), Mongolia (62.9%), and 
Poland (47.6%), (IMF GFS, State Treasury of Ukraine, Table 2)1. 
From the history of countries in transition being centrally planned, they inherited the 
perception of personal income tax as the one to be assigned to local budget. This tax 
scheme is thought to increase performance while being used for the local needs. For 
example, due to the budgetary law of Ukraine (BCU), PIT is shared between regional, 
district and local self-government budgets in a stipulated percentage. On the other 
hand, the share of revenues levied from PIT in the consolidated budget of Ukraine is 
among top-three taxes (along with VAT and EPT), thus being of high fiscal importance 
in the budgetary system.  
Regardless of the potential fiscal efficiency of PIT, resources of local governments 
need to be sufficient and to correspond with local needs of the community in order to 
sustain indispensable level of the living standards. According to Lyapina and other 
experts (following their chapters in Čapková, 2005: 144), tied revenues in Ukraine are 
unable to ensure sufficient possibilities for community development. As a result, local 
government bodies strive to replenish the budget, in stead of fostering territory 
development (Čapková, 2005: 144). Thus, financial self-reliance of local governments 
should be increased and balancing revenues between tiers of government should be 
done. 
This paper focuses on the revenue structure of local governments in Ukraine, and the 
role of PIT sharing in particular; it also compares Ukrainian evidence with international 
practice in order to propose viable solutions for reforming and improving the system of 
local government financing. In the first part of the paper, the analysis of revenues is 
conducted and the role of income taxes in local government financing is examined from 
an international prospective. In this part recent trends in financing local governments in 
developed economies and economies in transition are featured. The next three parts of 
the paper examine legal framework of local government financing in Ukraine, revenue 
structure of local budgets, and implementation of PIT sharing instrument between the 
tiers of government in Ukraine. Finally, after comparing international and Ukrainian 
practice, several reforms are proposed, aiming at providing local governments with 
tools and levers to generate sufficient financial resources. 
Revenues of local budgets and role of income taxes in local government 
financing: international perspective 
In federal states, where local governments are a priory thought to have higher level of 
autonomy than in unitary countries, the main sources of own revenue are a range of 
                                                
1  State Treasury of Ukraine is a source for data on Ukraine; IMF GFS statistics – for other 
countries. 
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taxes, income generated by trading or selling services, and borrowing (Steytler, 2009: 
420).  
The most important tax revenues are property taxes, commercial and payroll taxes, 
retail sales and income taxes, and other taxes, duties, levies, and fines. Local 
governments providing water, electricity, and other trading services often generate 
income from this source; it is the fastest growing and most important type of own-
source revenues for countries and municipalities in the United States. Given the tight 
regulatory framework, coupled with intense supervision of financial operations, the rate 
of borrowing by local governments often is low, and used almost exclusively by a few 
large urban municipalities (Steytler, 2009: 421-422). 
In a range of countries with federal systems of government examined by Steytler 
property taxes have traditionally been the principal source of revenue for local 
government (Steytler, 2009). Meanwhile, many local governments do not fully exploit 
the property-tax base. The main reason appears to be the unpopularity of increasing 
tax burden. This is the case in Australia, India, Spain, and the United States (421). 
There is a trend of local governments not always using their tax powers to the full, 
preferring instead to call for more intergovernmental transfers as a decision making 
option that is politically acceptable (421).  
Comparing the data on developed economies and transition economies of 2009 with 
the data of 2000 allows drawing the trends in dynamics of revenue structure and 
income taxation in particular in the groups of developed and transition countries during 
recent decade. 
Taxes are the main revenue sources of local budgets levied independently by local 
governments. The share of taxes in revenues of local governments both in developed 
economies and in transition economies in 2009 constituted around 41%. There is a 
trend of shrinking of the weight of tax revenues in local budgets across the world during 
recent decade. However, while in OECD countries respective share decreased 
slightly – by 3% (from 44.1% in 2000 to 41.0% in 2009), in transition economies it 
decreased considerably – by 16.2% (from 57.0% in 2000 to 40.8% in 2009) (Tables 1, 
2). 
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Table 1. Share of taxes in revenues of local governments in OECD 
countries in 2009 comparing to 20002 
Data source: IMF Government Finance Statistics. Average is counted as unweighted 
indicator; Spain is considered to be semi-federal state, though included in a group of unitary 
states; ‘un.st.’ stands for a group of unitary states, ‘fed.st.’ stands for a group of federal 
states, ‘all st.’ stands for both groups of states (in this Table and further) 
In federal OECD states the share of taxes in revenues of local governments during 
2000-2009 shrank by 6.2% (from 45.9% to 39.7%), in unitary – by 1.3% (from 43.0% to 
41.7%) (Table 1). During the last decade, there appeared enormous shortening of 
reliance of local governments on taxes in countries that recently entered EU and in the 
former USSR countries. Thus, in a group of countries that recently entered EU the 
share of taxes in revenues of local governments shrank by 15.3% (from 50.4% in 2000 
to 35.1% in 2009). In the group of former USSR countries this share shrank by 26.5% 
(from 66.8% to 40.3%) (Table 2). 
The majority of tax revenues of local budgets both in developed economies and in 
transition economies belong to three tax resources: income taxes, property taxes, and 
taxes on goods. In 2000-2009 their share constituted around 96%-98.5% of local 
revenues in OECD countries, and around 92-93% in transition economies. However, in 
countries that entered EU in 2004/2007 respective share is close to a group of 
developed countries and amounts to 98.9% (99.6% in 2000) (IMF GFS). 
                                                
2 Developed economies are represented with the data on members of the Organisation of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), subdivided into federal and unitary 
systems of government. For this study the data available at IMF GFS database is used. 
Distinction between federal and unitary states is not that sharp as the separation suggests. 
Federal 
countries: 2009 2000 
Unitary 
countries: 2009 2000 
Unitary 
countries:  2009 2000 
Australia 35.6% 37.1% Denmark 34.1% 52.1% New Zealand 55.8% 61.6% 
Austria 61.4% 53.5% Finland 47.4% 56.6% Norway 42.3% 40.7% 
Belgium 33.4% 30.1% France 44.5% 43.0% Portugal 33.6% 35.9% 
Canada 39.4% 42.1% Greece 6.6% 11.8% Sweden 70.9% 65.6% 
Germany 39.6% 38.8% Iceland 73.2% 79.2% Turkey 9.1% n/a 
Ireland 11.5% 73.6% Korea 27.0% n/a UK 12.9% 13.0% 
Italy 37.4% 43.1% Luxembourg 31.9% 39.5% Spain 43.4% 50.9% 
Switzerland 59.6% 48.8% Netherlands 8.3% 8.7% Average, un.st. 36.1% 43.0% 
Average, 
fed. st. 39.7% 45.9% Average, all st. 37.3% 44.1% 
Countries of OECD,  excl. Average, unit.st.     41.7% 43.0%  
Korea and Turkey:   Average, all st.     41.0% 44.1%  
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Table 2. Share of taxes in revenues of local governments in transition 
countries in 2009 comparing to 20003 
Countries 2009 2000 Countries 2009 2000 
Armenia 33.4% n/a Estonia 45.8% 53.5% 
Azerbaijan 93.8% n/a Latvia 50.9% 55.0% 
Belarus 66.0% 77.4% Lithuania 33.7% 84.6% 
Georgia 18.9% 83.6% Slovenia 39.2% 33.3% 
Kazakhstan 36.7% 83.0% Czech Rep 45.1% 55.1% 
Kyrgyz Rep 42.5% 38.6% Hungary 22.8% 33.0% 
Moldova 37.7% 52.5% Poland 30.9% 17.9% 
Russian Federation 18.1% 72.4% Slovak Rep 51.8% 57.5% 
Ukraine 53.1% 67.3% Bulgaria 20.9% 44.7% 
BiH 54.8% n/a Romania 9.8% 69.4% 
China 35.8% 42.4% Countries entered EU in 2004/2007: 
Croatia 61.6% 59.7% Average 35.1% 39.7% 
Macedonia Rep 29.6% n/a Former USSR countries:   
Serbia 47.3% n/a Average 44.2% 40.5% 
Mongolia 62.8% 41.1% Transition economies:   
Iran 72.2% 75.5% Average 42.9% 34.2% 
Former USSR countries, excl. Armenia and 
Azerbaijan: 
Transition economies, excl. Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, BiH, Macedonia, Serbia: 
Average 40.3% 40.5% Average 40.8% 34.2% 
Data source: IMF Government Finance Statistics. Exemptions in the data: Azerbaijan, Republic 
of Macedonia, and Romania – 2008  
Income taxes and property taxes, in their turn, are principal sources of revenue of local 
governments and amount to around 80% (OECD countries) and 70% (transition 
economies) of tax revenues of local budgets as of 2009. Their role over the last decade 
has increased. In OECD countries, the reason is the growing role of property taxes 
which demonstrated 5.1% growth over the last decade, the tendency being mostly 
traced in federal OECD countries (by 12%).  
                                                
3 According to EBRD Transition Report 2010, transition economies are listed as follows: Central 
Europe and the Baltic States: Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak 
Rep., Slovenia; South-eastern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia; Turkey; Eastern Europe and Caucasus: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine; Russia; Central Asia: Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Rep., Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. IMF also includes Iran and 
China. In this study transition economies are represented with the data of 26 countries, 
including countries in transition (9 countries representing economies of the former USSR, 4 
Balkan countries, Mongolia, Iran, and China) and 10 countries that successfully completed 
transformation process. For this study the data available at IMF GFS database is used. 
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While in former USSR countries the share of income and property taxes increased by 
6.9% (from 72.1% to 79.0%), in the countries that recently entered EU in 2004/2007 
the share of income and property taxes in financing local government decreased by 
11% (from 92.0% to 81.0%) (Table 3-6). However, this is a converging trend, since in 
the countries that recently entered EU the role of these taxes is inherently higher than 
in any other group of countries.  
Table 3. Income taxes (including PIT) and property tax share in local tax 
revenues in OECD countries in 2009 
Unitary 
countries: Income PIT Property 
Federal 
countries: Income PIT Property 
Denmark 89.0% 87.1% 10.9% Australia 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Finland 94.7% 86.5% 5.2% Austria 34.2% 27.9% 9.2% 
France 0.0% 0.0% 70.7% Belgium 40.1% 40.1% 57.8% 
Greece 0.0% 0.0% 63.8% Canada 0.0% 0.0% 97.8% 
Iceland 77.7% 77.7% 19.8% Germany 80.4% 42.2% 13.3% 
Korea 16.8% 16.8% 46.9% Ireland 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Luxembourg 91.7% 0.0% 6.3% Italy 26.1% 21.2% 10.6% 
Netherlands 0.0% 0.0% 36.3% Switzerland 84.2% 68.0% 14.3% 
New Zealand 0.0% 0.0% 89.0% Average, fed.st. 33.1% 24.9% 50.4% 
Norway 88.2% 88.2% 10.3% Average, unit.st. 39.7% 30.9% 42.7% 
Portugal 30.3% 19.8% 46.4% Average, all st. 35.9% 27.6% 43.5% 
Spain 20.9% 16.8% 36.3% Countries of OECD,    
Sweden 50.3% 43.1% 2.7% excl. Korea and Turkey:    
Turkey 0.0% 0.0% 52.0% Average, unit.st. 41.8% 32.2% 38.3% 
UK 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% Average, all st. 38.5% 29.5% 42.9% 
Data source: IMF Government Finance Statistics. Exemptions in the data: Finland and 
Switzerland – 2008, New Zealand – 2007  
 
Meanwhile, the role of property taxation raised in all groups of transition economies: in 
countries in transition, the overall share in revenues of local governments almost 
doubled – increasing by 9% – from 12.6% to 21.6%; in the former USSR the share 
increased from 11.4% to 17.8%; in countries that recently entered EU it increased from 
16.7% to 27.8% (Tables 5, 6). The heaviest reliance on property tax is in the countries 
that entered EU. This is the result of successful implementation of real estate market 
reform in these countries. 
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Table 4. Income taxes (including PIT) and property tax share in local tax 
revenues in OECD countries in 2000 
Unitary 
countries: Income PIT Property 
Federal 
countries: Income PIT Property 
Denmark 93.6% 91.3% 6.4% Australia 0.0% 0.0% 100% 
Finland 95.7% 74.2% 4.2% Austria 39.2% 31.5% 8.9% 
France 0.0% 0.0% 81.7% Belgium 29.9% 29.9% 58.5% 
Greece 0.0% 0.0% 65.8% Canada 0.0% 0.0% 94.7% 
Iceland 43.6% 37.6% 9.5% Germany 80.5% 44.3% 13.3% 
Luxembourg 92.9% 0.0% 5.6% Ireland 49.0% 34.8% 2.9% 
Netherlands 0.0% 0.0% 44.4% Italy 17.7% 16.3% 13.2% 
New Zealand 0.0% 0.0% 85.4% Switzerland 84.4% 72.2% 15.3% 
Norway 95.0% 95.0% 2.9% Average, fed. st. 37.6% 28.6% 38.3% 
Portugal 22.7% 8.0% 46.9% Average, unit.st.  
Spain 18.1% n/a 29.7%   39.9% 29.4% 37.5% 
Sweden 56.8% 47.1% 4.5% Average, all st.     
UK 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%   39.0% 29.1% 37.8% 
Data source: IMF Government Finance Statistics 
Table 5. Income taxes (including PIT) and property tax share in local tax 
revenues in transition economies and countries that recently 
completed the transformation process, in 2009 
Countries Income PIT Property   Income PIT Property 
Armenia 0.0% 0.0% 86.6% Estonia 91.5% 91.5% 7.0% 
Azerbaijan 49.5% 28.1% 2.8% Latvia 88.2% 88.2% 10.7% 
Belarus 45.5% 29.0% 11.0% Lithuania 85.8% 85.8% 10.2% 
Georgia 28.9% 28.9% 70.6% Slovenia 78.9% 78.9% 16.0% 
Kazakhstan 35.1% 35.1% 16.1% Czech Rep. 49.7% 24.2% 3.7% 
Kyrgyz Rep. 43.9% 20.6% 23.7% Hungary 0.0% 0.0% 20.7% 
Moldova 72.8% 68.9% 10.7% Poland 59.2% 47.6% 28.4% 
Russian Fed. 81.4% 69.8% 16.7% Slovak Rep. 75.1% 75.1% 11.9% 
Ukraine 76.0% 75.2% 2.6% Bulgaria 2.2% 2.2% 97.7% 
BiH 8.4% 8.4% 12.9% Romania 1.5% 1.1% 72.0% 
China 21.3% 5.7% 14.0% Countries entered EU in 2004/2007: 
Croatia 90.6% 90.6% 5.2% Average 53.2% 49.5% 27.8% 
Macedonia 3.1% 3.1% 34.6% Former USSR countries: 
Serbia 69.5% 67.6% 18.3% Average 55.1% 47.4% 22.3% 
Mongolia 67.2% 62.9% 6.3% Transition economies: 
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Iran 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Average 45.7% 39.8% 23.4% 
Former USSR countries, excl. Armenia and 
Azerbaijan: 
Transition economies, excl. Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
BiH, Macedonia, Serbia: 
Average 61.2% 54.0% 17.8% Average 50.4% 44.2% 21.6% 
Data source: IMF Government Finance Statistics. Exemptions in the data: Azerbaijan, Republic 
of Macedonia, and Romania – 2008  
Table 6. Income taxes (including PIT) and property tax share in local tax 
revenues in transition economies and countries that recently 
completed the transformation process, in 2000 
Countries Income PIT Property Countries Income PIT Property 
Belarus 30.8% 19.9% 6.7% Estonia 88.6% 88.6% 9.0% 
Georgia 52.0% 29.5% 26.2% Latvia 79.7% 79.7% 18.8% 
Kazakhstan 50.9% 19.3% 10.1% Lithuania 91.9% 91.9% 7.8% 
Kyrgyz Rep 37.9% 20.5% 0.0% Slovenia 72.2% 72.2% 20.2% 
Moldova 55.2% 35.7% 25.6% Czech Rep. 90.8% 66.3% 4.6% 
Russian Federation 49.4% 20.7% 9.8% Hungary 48.1% 48.1% 11.8% 
Ukraine 70.2% 52.1% 0.0% Poland 54.1% 48.8% 40.5% 
China 26.7% 9.1% 6.0% Slovak Rep 59.9% 50.3% 28.2% 
Croatia 85.0% 70.3% 11.3% Bulgaria 89.7% 60.6% 10.3% 
Mongolia 52.8% 29.0% 0.5% Romania 78.1% 75.8% 16.2% 
Iran 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%       
Former USSR countries: Countries entered EU in 2004/2007:  
Average 60.7% 45.8% 11.4% Average 75.3% 68.2% 16.7% 
Transition economies:   Average 63.1% 49.3% 13.1% 
Data source: IMF Government Finance Statistics 
The comparison of importance of income taxes, and personal income tax in particular, 
in local tax revenues of selected OECD countries and transition economies is 
illustrated in Tables 3 and 5. From the fiscal point of view, in countries of OECD income 
taxation is prevailing in a third of countries, as well as property taxation. In contrast, in 
transition economies 11 out of 26 countries rely on income taxation, and 10 out of 
those 11 – on personal income taxation. Only 4 transition economies rely on property 
taxation. Thus, in transition economies, the role of income taxation (and personal 
income taxation in particular) is prevailing in financing local governments. This trend is 
related to the peculiarities of flows of financial resources and the low level of 
development of real estate market. 
The heaviest reliance of sub-national governments on income taxes is in the Nordic 
countries. In Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, Switzerland, and 
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Germany income taxation accounts for more than 75% of local tax revenues. On the 
other hand, the countries where sub-national governments do not have direct access to 
income tax revenue generated in the region include federal states such as Australia 
and Canada, and unitary states such as France, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Luxembourg has no access to personal 
income taxation, only to corporate income taxation. All countries (excluding the 
Netherlands) that do not have access to income taxation at the local level rely on 
property taxation. 
In federal OECD states the role of income taxes decreased over the last decade. The 
share of income taxes in local tax revenues shortened by 4.3% of local tax revenues 
(from 37.6% in 2000 to 33.3% in 2009) mostly as a result of a 3.7% decrease in 
personal income taxation (from 28.6% to 24.9%). In contrast, in unitary states their 
share increased: income taxes from 39.0% to 41.8% with PIT increasing from 29.4% to 
32.2% (Tables 3, 4). 
While in 2000 the structure of tax revenues of local governments in unitary OECD 
countries was almost identical to federal countries, by 2009 the disparities in sources of 
financing had widened. Thus, the role of income taxes in unitary states became higher 
than in federal states by 8.6% of local tax revenues (41.8% comparing to 33.1%), 
including 7.3% in PIT (32.2% to 24.9%). The share of property tax in tax revenues of 
local governments in federal states exceeded the share of property tax in unitary states 
by 12.1% (50.4% compared to 38.3%) (Tables 3, 4). 
Overall, over the last decade income taxation in transition economies shrank by 10% of 
local tax revenues – from 60.2% in 2000 to 50.4% in 2009. In transition economies the 
share of PIT in taxes of local governments amounted to 44.2% as of 2009. Over the 
last decade it decreased slightly compared to 47.1% in 2000. Thus, in transition 
economies the role of personal income taxation is prevailing. In countries that recently 
entered EU the share of income taxes shrank by 22% – from 75.3% in 2000 to 53.2% 
in 2009, and PIT by 19% – from 68.2% to 49.5% accordingly (Tables 5, 6). In contrast, 
in countries of the former USSR, income taxation increased from 60.7% in 2000 to 
61.2% in 2009, mostly due to PIT that increased from 45.8% to 54.0% (Tables 5, 6). 
Thus, the heaviest reliance on income taxation, and PIT in particular, exists in the 
countries of the former USSR. 
In a range of federal countries examined by Steytler, the power of municipalities to set 
their own rates is significantly varied between countries and within countries (Steytler, 
2009: 421). Systems of local income taxation are rather diverse. In the Nordic 
countries, local income taxes are levied as a surcharge on the central tax base, with a 
flat rate established locally. Flat rates range across counties and municipalities: in 
Sweden – 29-37%, Finland – 16-21%, Norway – 28% (according to national legislation 
as of 2009, EYGM, 2009). At the same time, central income tax rates are progressive 
(except for Sweden). 
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In Japan, local income tax is a surcharge on the national tax with progressive rates 
based on a system of per capita rates determined both nationally and by the size of the 
municipality. National individual income tax rate varies from 5% to 40%, while local 
inhabitant tax rates are flat rate plus per capita levy – 4% of prefectural and 6% of 
municipal taxes (EYGM, 2009). 
In Switzerland, local income tax is levied as a surcharge on cantonal income taxes with 
progressive rates established locally. Here the tax base of local taxes is both income 
and assets, including a tax on personal wealth. As of 2009 the maximum overall federal 
tax rate is 11.5%, while cantonal and municipal tax rates range from about 14% to 35% 
(EYGM, 2009). 
In Germany, the system of tax sharing between the tiers of government includes both 
corporate and personal income taxes. While corporate income tax accounts for about 
40% of local tax revenue being the biggest revenue source of local budgets, personal 
income tax is on the second place by its share. PIT is distributed to local governments 
as a share of the national income and wage tax. Tax is levied due to a progressive rate 
up to 45%. According to the Constitution, 15% of PIT revenues are assigned to local 
governments while the share for each municipality may vary across the country 
(Kitchen, 2004: 8-9). 
In Croatia local income tax is a surcharge on the national tax. While national tax rate is 
progressive, ranging from 15% to 45%, rates assigned by municipalities vary from 0% 
to 18%, with the highest rate in Zagreb (EYGM, 2009). However, in transition 
economies income taxes are mostly redistributed to regions applying tax-sharing 
scheme, which is also the case in Ukraine. In general, this is the cause of a weak base 
of local taxes. 
To conclude, taxes are the main sources of own revenue of local governments across 
the world. However, trends of dynamics of revenue structure and revenue sources that 
prevail in the budgets of local governments differ in countries in transition and in 
developed economies. Over the last decade, a trend of shrinking tax revenues in the 
sources of financing local governments across the world may be traced in both 
developed economies and in economies in transition. This trend may be a result of 
reductions in the resources that are redistributed through local budgets after financial 
an economic crisis that started in 2008. This tendency is stronger in transition 
economies. In case of developed countries, this trend is stronger for federal countries 
than for unitary states. In addition, shrinking tax revenues might be a sign of higher 
centralisation of resources throughout the world economic system. 
The role of income and property taxes overall in tax revenues of local governments 
grew up during last decade in a group of countries of OECD and of the former USSR, 
while it fell away in a group of countries that entered EU during the fifth enlargement (in 
2004/2007). Both in developed economies and transition economies, the share of 
property taxation increased considerably.  
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While income taxation increased in OECD unitary states, it shrank in federal countries. 
Income taxation also heavily decreased in the countries that recently entered EU, while 
in the group of countries of the former USSR the share of income taxation increased. In 
the countries of the former USSR, income tax, and personal income tax in particular, is 
used to be the basic and prevailing tax revenue source of local governments, and in 
this region, its role has grown over the last decade. Here the share of income tax is 
higher than in any other group of countries so it makes income taxation in Ukraine, and 
PIT in particular, of specific interest. 
Legal framework of local government financing in Ukraine 
In order to analyse the system of local government financing in Ukraine it is necessary 
to investigate it in correspondence with the system of local government, 
intergovernmental fiscal relations, and legal framework. 
Ukraine is a unitary state with three tiers of local government: (i) regions (‘oblasts’), 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC), cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol (regional level); 
(ii) districts (‘rayons’) and cities of regional significance; (iii) towns, rural settlements, 
and villages. The system of government of Ukraine is presented in Chart 1. 
Chart 1. System of government of Ukraine 
 
1 Number of councils of villages is 10 278. Number of administrative-territorial units as of  
01.01.2010, Data source: Ukrstat 
According to the Budgetary Code of Ukraine (article 5), the Ukrainian budgetary system 
consists of central budget and local budgets. Budgets of ARC, regional (oblast), district 
(rayon), city districts and local self-government budgets are local budgets. Budgets of 
local self-government are budgets of territorial communities of villages, rural 
settlements, towns, and their unions (Chart 1). 
Central government 
Region (Oblast) 
24 
District (Rayon) 
490 
City (Misto) of ARC and 
regional significance, 179 
City district 
(Rayon mista) 
 118 
Rural settlement 
(Selyshche) 
885 
Village 
(Selo) 
28 4711 
 
Towns (Misto) 
of district 
significance 
280 
AR Crimea 
Kyiv & Sevastopol Cities 
Sydorovych, Financing Local Government in Ukraine                                                                17	  
 
The main principles of functioning of the budgetary system are laid in the basis of the 
national legislation and the Charter of Local Self-Government. In 1996 Ukraine signed 
a Charter of Local Self-Government which entered into force in 1998. According to 
Article 9 on the financial resources of local authorities (Charter), the central principles 
of fiscal decentralisation are the following:  
• ‘Local authorities shall be entitled, within national economic 
policy, to adequate financial resources of their own, which 
they may dispose freely within the framework of their 
powers; 
• Local authorities’ financial resources shall be 
commensurate with the responsibilities provided by the 
constitution and the law.’  
These sub-articles imply accountability of the state on the adequacy of financial 
resources of local governments. These issues are implemented within the legal 
framework of Ukraine. 
The right of local governments to impose local taxes was prescribed by the Decree of 
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 1993, ‘On Local Taxes and Charges’. The Decree 
allowed for 17 local taxes and charges (until 2011 the amount of taxes ranged from 15 
to 17). These included a charge on parking, a market charge, a charge on order of the 
flat, a charge on dogs, a resort charge, a charge on participation in hippodrome 
competitions, a charge on gain and on totaliser in competitions, a tax on advertisement, 
a charge on the use of local symbolics, a charge on movie recording, a charge on local 
auctions and lotteries, a communal tax, a license charge on trade allocations, a tax on 
sale of import goods, and a tax on real estate other than land property. However, most 
of these fees were still weak due to administrative reasons, and do not lend themselves 
to collecting much income for the local budgets of the country. 
Starting from 2011, according to the Tax Code of Ukraine passed in 2010 (article 10) 
the amount of local taxes and charges was reduced from 15 to 5. There are 3 
obligatory local taxes and charges such as a tax on real estate (other than land 
property), single tax and a license charges for special entrepreneurial activities. The 
two optional charges are a charge on parking of transport and a tourist charge. 
As a result of the legislation amendments, local governments obtained even less 
capacity and tax base to independently obtain revenues generated locally. Though the 
tax base of the previously allowed taxes and charges was weak, the legislative 
changes might be a reason for the shortage of sufficient resources for local 
governments for independent decision making, not relying on the governments of a 
higher level. 
In the first decade of independence, budgetary relations were regulated by the Law of 
Ukraine of 1991, ‘On the Budgetary System of Ukraine’. Before the Budgetary Code of 
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2001 was approved, the process of sharing of national taxes between tiers of 
government had not been stipulated in any document. Thus, national taxes were 
shared between the levels of government purely based on the ad hoc principle, due to 
the Law on the State Budget and regulations of local councils for the respective year. 
In this period, local budgets were enclosed into the budgets of the higher level (regional 
budget). The main revenue source of sub-national budgets was EPT. 30% of EPT was 
assigned to the central government, and 70% – to the other budgets. However, the tax 
was assigned to the ARC, regional, Kyiv and Sevastopol governments, which, in their 
turn, had the power to distribute this share of EPT between the enclosed subordinated 
budgets of the lower level. The ad hoc principle of allocation of resources made the 
process of decision making non-transparent. As a result, some budgets, being left 
without sufficient revenues, became dependent on the central government. These 
circumstances decreased accountability of all levels of government. PIT was another 
source of revenues of sub-national budgets; however, in every budgetary period it was 
subject to negotiations. 
In 2001, the reform of budgetary relations was conducted in accordance with the 
Budgetary Code of Ukraine. The law gave sub-national governments more self-
reliance, sustainability, and thus, independence in decision-making, assigning tied 
revenues to the budgets of all levels. The Budgetary Code of Ukraine of 2001 included 
most of the principles of local self-governance. In 2010, it was updated slightly and a 
new version entered into force in 2011. During the same year, tax reform took place. It 
was implemented in the approval of the first version of Tax Code of Ukraine. 
The amendments of the Budgetary Code that should have entered into force in 2010 
(but were vetoed by the President), became an unsuccessful attempt to settle the direct 
intergovernmental relations between central budget and all local budgets. Though 
according to these amendments decentralisation process was said to be deepened, in 
fact they would be a move in the opposite direction. In the conditions of scarcity of 
revenues of local budgets, these changes would lead to higher centralisation of fiscal 
resources, and local governments would become more dependent on the central 
government. 
According to article 64 of the effective Budgetary Code of Ukraine, among the 
revenues that are tied to the budgets of local self-government there are a part of PIT; 
user charges on forest resources, mineral resources digging, special usage of water; 
some types of license charges and registration fees; and state due. Previously single 
tax was also partly included in revenues of local governments (BCU, 2001, article 64, 
65). 
According to article 66 of the Budgetary Code, ARC and regional budgets receive 25% 
of PIT levied on the corresponding territory; 50% of user charges on forest resources, 
digging of mineral resources, special usage of water; and 100% of charges on other 
natural resources and some of registration fees. District budgets receive 50% of PIT 
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levied on the territory of villages, rural settlements, towns of district significance; license 
charges for special entrepreneurial activities; registration fees; and fines.  
Before 2011 regional budgets also received 25% of the land fee levied on the 
corresponding territory, and license charges for special entrepreneurial activities; and 
district budgets – 15% of the land fee levied on the territory of villages, rural 
settlements, and towns of district significance. Local self-government is financed by a 
share of PIT (25%), of state duty, and of a single tax; license charges for special 
entrepreneurial activities issued by the respective councils; entrepreneurship 
registration fees; trade patent fees; and fines that are levied by the respective councils 
(BCU, article 65). Starting from 2011 land fee is not tied to local budgets. 
Structure of revenues of local governments in Ukraine 
From a fiscal point of view, tax revenues are the most important part of the budget 
revenues in Ukraine. In 2010 they constituted 74.5% of the revenues of consolidated 
budget. Income taxes, in their turn, constituted 29.1%, about a half of which was made 
up by personal income tax – 16.2% (State Treasury of Ukraine). 
During the last decade there has been a trend of decreasing fiscal independence of 
local budgets as a part of consolidated budget of Ukraine. It is based on the 
comparison of share of local budgets (excluding transfers) in the budgetary system 
during recent decade, which decreased from 29.3% in 2000 to 25.6% in 2010 (State 
Treasury of Ukraine). This tendency of shrinking revenues of sub-national budgets 
corresponds to the world trend. However, it implies the increased dependence of local 
governments on the grant resources from the central government. Thus, over the last 
decade the share of transfers from state budget to local budgets in total revenues of 
local governments doubled (from 23.7% in 2000 to 49.5% in 2010) (State Treasury of 
Ukraine).Taxes are also the most solid revenue source of budgets on the local level. In 
2010 their share in local revenues constituted 83.9%. Along with taxes, there are other 
revenues of local budgets such as non-tax revenues (10.9% in 2010), revenues from 
transactions on capital (3.2%), and special-purpose funds (2.0%) (State Treasury of 
Ukraine).  
Shifting of the importance of the PIT and the other tax revenues can be drawn from the 
comparison of Charts 2 and 3. The share of income taxes during 2000-2010 years 
increased almost by 4% (from 72.2% to 76.1%). The increasing importance of income 
taxes in sub-national budgets is caused both by higher level of redistribution of income 
taxes from central government to the regions and municipalities, and growing level of 
incomes of population. In this regard there are 2 divergent trends: increase in 
importance of PIT and decrease in weight of EPT in sub-national budgets. 
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Chart 2. Structure of tax revenues of local budgets in Ukraine in 2000 
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Data source: Annual report of State Treasury of Ukraine, 2000  
Thus, the share of PIT in revenues of local budgets increased by almost 40% – from 
54.4% in 2000 (Chart 2) to 75.5% in 2010 (Chart 3). At the same time the share of EPT 
heavily decreased from 17.8% in 2000 (Chart 2) to 0.6% in 2010 (Chart 3). Thus, PIT 
adopted the prevailing role of the revenue source of sub-national governments in 
Ukraine. 
In comparison, the share of local taxes (they are included into ‘Other taxes’ in Charts 2 
and 3) is still very poor. While the role of property has recently evolved in Ukraine, the 
low share of property tax, which still is not seen as a local tax, and its shrinking from 
4.6% in 2000 (Chart 2) to 2.8% in 2010 (Chart 3) is an alarming tendency. These 
results call for the reform of the system of local taxation and a shift to property tax as a 
source of revenues of local governments. However, primarily the reform of property tax 
requires institutional changes, setting proper real estate market conditions, and 
establishing property evaluation procedures. 
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Chart 3. Structure of tax revenues of local budgets in Ukraine in 2010 
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Data source: Annual report of State Treasury of Ukraine, 2010  
As it can be seen from the charts above, local budgets in Ukraine are mostly funded 
from the national taxes and charges. The share of tied revenues is higher than the 
share of own resources. In comparison, the share of local taxes is rather low. There is 
a need to increase the role of local taxes in order to enhance financial independence 
and implement the principle of autonomy and accountability of local governments that 
is implied by the Charter of local self-government. This is the main direction of 
strengthening local budgets within fiscal decentralisation trends. In order to increase 
accountability in allocation of resources and expand the economic power and tax base 
of the regions and municipalities, stimulus should be provided to widen locally 
generated revenues. 
PIT sharing between the tiers of government in Ukraine 
According to the Tax Code and Budgetary Code of Ukraine, PIT is a national tax 
shared between all tiers of government. The tax rate is uniform for all the 
municipalities, since the tax is national. The main reform of PIT was conducted in 2004. 
The reform was rather successful in terms of widening of tax base and so-called 
legalisation of incomes of the population. It included the shift in the scale of taxation 
from a progressive to a flat rate (with a tax rate of 13% in 2004-2006, and 15% in 2007-
2010). The efficiency of this reform was evaluated in the previous paper (Sydorovych, 
2010). According to TCU, starting from the second quarter of 2011 the tax rate is 
progressive. While the main rate remains on the level of 15%, excess of revenues upon 
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the level of 10 minimal salaries determined yearly on January 1, is taxed with the rate 
of 17% (TCU, article 167).  
Though from a conceptual point of view, the sharing of national taxes on income of 
individuals is thought to be better assigned to the jurisdiction of residence than to the 
jurisdiction of employment, it must give way to practical reality (McLure, 1999: 44). 
Since the final withholding of individual tax basic in the Ukrainian practice, generally for 
administrative reasons it is hard to implement with the residence-based taxation. PIT is 
assigned to the jurisdiction of employment. Thus, PIT, which is paid by an employer as 
a tax agent, is assigned to the respective local budget on its location principle. 
According to the Budgetary Code of Ukraine, PIT is shared between all sub-national 
tiers of government (except for tax levied in the city of Kyiv under BCU of 2010). 
According to article 65 of the Budgetary Code, the shares are distributed to sub-
national budgets in the following proportions (Chart 4): 
• 100% of PIT levied in the city of Sevastopol and 50% of PIT levied in the city of 
Kyiv are assigned to these cities (according to article 29 of BCU the other 50% 
of PIT levied in the city of Kyiv is assigned to the state budget). Between 2001 
and 2010 the lump sum of PIT levied in the city of Kyiv belonged to the budget 
of the city; 
• 75% of PIT levied on the territories of cities of Autonomous republic of Crimea 
(ARC) and in cities of regional significance is assigned to these cities; 
Chart 4. PIT share in the revenues of local governments in Ukraine 
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• 25% of PIT levied on the territories of towns of district significance, rural 
settlements, and villages is assigned to the corresponding budgets. 
According to article 66 of the Budgetary Code the shares of PIT revenues transferred 
to local governments are distributed to sub-national budgets in the following 
proportions (Chart 5): 
• 25% of PIT levied on the territories of towns of district significance, rural 
settlements and villages, and in cities of ARC and regional significance is 
assigned to the budgets of ARC and regions; 
• 50% of PIT levied on the territories of towns of district significance, rural 
settlements, and villages is assigned to the budgets of districts. 
Chart 5. Shares of PIT prescribed as transfers to local governments in 
Ukraine 
 
 
The shares of PIT assigned to national and local levels of government correspond with 
recent decentralisation trends. The importance of international cities (e.g. Kyiv) has 
rapidly grown in the context of recent globalisation process. Currently, cities 
concentrate major powers of economic development and prosperity. In addition, the 
quality of conditions in urban areas often determines location decisions for companies 
and investors. Thus, there is economic justification of the necessity in assigning 
additional taxes and greater fiscal autonomy to the cities to sustain their compatibility. 
This is the reason why the cities get a higher share of PIT resources in Ukraine. 
However, it should not discriminate rural areas in their development. 
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Conclusions 
Recent decentralisation trends, strengthening of the relations between central and local 
tiers of government and the decreasing role of the middle tier, are accompanied with 
devolution of additional responsibilities to local governments without sufficient grants 
from senior governments. Following these trends requires rethinking the model of local 
government financing by decision-makers and assigning additional revenues to local 
governments to make them fiscally sustainable and commensurate to their 
constituencies’ preferences.  
The principal revenue sources of local governments are locally generated revenues 
such as local taxes and sharing of national taxes, as well as grants devolved from the 
other tiers of government. An important issue of fiscal decentralisation policy is finding 
the trade-off between the types of revenues defined in the legal framework.  
According to the criteria for choosing revenues generated locally for financing local 
services, the most appropriate taxes are property tax (which is not a viable solution for 
economies in transition), individual income, and sales taxes. In transition economies, 
where local governments traditionally have relied on income taxes, revenue sharing of 
the national taxes is still administratively easier to implement. Thus, personal income 
tax (PIT) sharing is one of the most appropriate and significant revenue sources of 
local governments, being highly important in the decentralisation process in a number 
of transition economies. 
In the countries of the former USSR, income tax and personal income tax in particular 
is used to be the basic and prevailing tax revenue source of local governments, and in 
this region, its role has grown over the last decade. Here the share of income tax is 
higher than in OECD countries, countries that have already completed transformation 
process, and other transition economies, which makes income taxation in Ukraine, and 
PIT in particular, of specific interest. 
Comparison of shares of income taxes in the revenues of sub-national governments in 
the countries of the OECD, in Ukraine, and other countries in transition has reflected 
that there are a number of economies relying on PIT as a key resource base for 
meeting their expenditure needs to accomplish the functions assigned to them. Where 
it is true, this tax plays the role of a local tax as a surcharge on the national tax in one 
group of countries, or it is implemented within the mechanism of revenue sharing. 
During the recent decade PIT has adopted the prevailing role of the revenue source of 
sub-national governments in Ukraine. In Ukrainian practice, PIT is presented as a 
revenue tied to all sub-national tiers of government in the parts stipulated in the 
Budgetary Code. It allows local governments to rely on stable resources, thus 
increasing their efficiency. In the context of comparatively successful reforms of 
personal income taxation in Ukraine, along with fiscal function, PIT also plays an 
important role in stabilisation and redistribution of resources within the country. 
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While PIT is distributed to the regions and municipalities as a sharing of national tax 
rather efficiently, which is reflected in recent trends, there is still a high need for reforms 
of local taxation. Under the conditions of growing incomes of population, strengthening 
of institutional structure, and transformation of property relations, a shift to property tax 
in local government financing is highly important. This is one of directions for future 
reforms. The other direction is enhancing independence of local budgets through 
increasing their own resources. In addition to successful PIT sharing implementation, 
the weight and importance of local taxes and local budgets in the budgetary system 
should be widened. This would increase accountability of local governments and 
approximate citizens to the decision-making process. 
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